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Neff: Risk - A Multi-Layered Approach

Operational safety is a mandatory tangible and intangible element in the
commercial airline industry. Air carriers must not only have a demonstrable safety
record, they must also create a passenger feeling of being safe. Industry safety
requires a multi-layered approach to identifying hazards and mitigating the
associated risks. In order to emphasize this imperative, Congress requires operators
that hold an air carrier certificate operate with the highest degree of safety. To
ensure compliance, Congress promulgated Title 49 of the U.S. Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) § 44702 that requires that the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) Administrator to“…consider the duty of an air carrier to provide service
with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest…” (Title 49 –
TRANSPORTATION, Sec. 44702 - Issuance of certificates, 2006, p. 907) prior to
the issuance of an air carrier certificate. In order to assure the highest level of safety
in the air carrier industry, the FAA promulgated 14 CFR part 5 in 2015 that
outlined, among other things, the four components of a Safety Management System
(SMS) (FAA, 2020a). The FAA issued this regulation as a member state of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to comply with directives
embodied in Annex 19, Safety Management (ICAO, 2013). Additionally, the FAA
revised its national policy regarding operator SMS on June 24, 2020 when it issued
FAA Order 8000.369C (FAA, 2020b). This latest update emphasized the
importance of SMS to industry safety, and it reinforced the “continuous
improvement” (FAA, 2020b) of the four elements of the SMS: Safety Policy, Safety
Risk Management, Safety Assurance, and Safety Promotion.
The purpose of the Congressional approach to statutorily reinforce the
philosophy of safety is multi-faceted. It requires operators to be accountable to
passengers, employees, regulators, and to managers for the health and well being
of the enterprise. The application of the SMS components is a structured method to
protect assets, both human and materiel. Through the SMS decision process,
financial asset allocation decisions are made in an efficient manner to apportion
assets where safety and operational issues are shown to have the highest risk.
Pareto, the Italian economist, analyzed the 80/20 phenomenon correctly when he
determined that funds allocated to mitigate 20% of the hazards resulted in an 80%
reduction in risk (Duszynski, 2020).
Common Definitions
The common definitions used in the SMS programs are listed in Table 1.
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Table 1
Common Definitions
Term
Hazard

Definition
A condition that could foreseeably cause or
contribute to an aircraft accident as defined in 49 CFR
830.2.
Risk
The composite of predicted severity and likelihood of
the potential effect of a hazard.
Risk Control
A means to reduce or eliminate the effects of hazards.
Safety Assurance
Processes within the SMS that function
systematically to ensure the performance and
effectiveness of safety risk controls and that the
organization meets or exceeds its safety objectives
through the collection, analysis, and assessment of
information.
Safety
Management The formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to
System
managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness
of safety risk controls. It includes systematic
procedures, practices, and policies for the
management of safety risk.
Safety Objective
A measurable goal or desirable outcome related to
safety
Safety Performance
Realized or actual safety accomplishment relative to
the organization's safety objectives.
Safety Policy
The certificate holder's documented commitment to
safety, which defines its safety objectives and the
accountabilities and responsibilities of its employees
in regards to safety.
Safety Promotion
A combination of training and communication of
safety information to support the implementation and
operation of an SMS in an organization.
Safety Risk Management A process within the SMS composed of describing
the system, identifying the hazards, and analyzing,
assessing and controlling risk.
Note. Adapted from (Federal Aviation Administration, 2020a, para. §5.5)
SMS
An operator or provider SMS program is “The formal, top-down,
organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness
of safety risk controls. It includes systematic procedures, practices, and policies for
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the management of safety risk” (FAA, 2020a, para. §5.5). Figure 1 displays a
concept diagram of SMS.

.
Figure 1. The Four SMS Components (FAA, 2017a, para. 3).
Safety Policy
The SMS order sets forth four foundational components of SMS; Safety
Policy, Safety Risk Management, Safety Assurance, and Safety Promotion (FAA,
2020b). Safety Policy is the centerpiece of the SMS program. It outlines the duties,
responsibilities, and accountabilities of all employees necessary to document the
organization’s commitment to safety. The Safety Policy requires the naming of an
accountable executive who is the executive ultimately responsible for the success
of the organization and for organizational safety (FAA, 2020a). In addition to
setting managements’ and employees’ expectations and commitment to operate
with the highest level of safety, the safety policy includes the operators’ safety
response plan and establishes safety reporting systems to be used to identify safety
issues throughout the company (FAA, 2020).
Safety Risk Management
The second component of SMS is Safety Risk Management that endeavors
to establish a formalized program to identify hazards and to codify the subsequent
risks the hazards present. In general, the FAA provides oversight and monitoring
of the hazard analyses and risk management decisions the operator applies to ensure
the highest level of safety (FAA, 2017b). Additionally, the FAA charges
organizations with the responsibility to document whatever actions are taken to
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mitigate risks and to establish a public-private communications path with the FAA
to further enhance safety risk management.
Safety Assurance
The purpose of the Safety Assurance component is to ensure that the safety
mitigations implemented based on the data collected during the risk management
phase have the desired effect on safe operations (FAA, 2020b). This element of
SMS incorporates the concepts of system analysis, hazard identification, safety risk
analysis, risk assessment, risk control, and tracking and monitoring selected
mitigations (FAA, 2017b). A continuous feedback loop provides up-to-date data
for responsible managers to track the effectiveness of the selected risk mitigations.
In this manner, managers are able to analyze mitigation effectiveness and modify
the safety controls if the mitigations do not provide measurable target
improvements in operational safety. Data analysis through audits, evaluations, and
continuous monitoring through employee reporting systems contribute to the
effectiveness of decisions implemented or modified by responsible managers
(FAA, 2017b).
Safety Promotion
The Safety Promotion component is the information and training element
for SMS. This component connects the training of safety systems to the
communication of safety information to employees who support the overall SMS.
Under the umbrella of the Safety Promotion component, the organization provides
safety training to develop appropriate job category proficiencies in order to
contribute to the overall operational safety. Responsible managers should use the
Safety Promotion component to disseminate information to ensure an informed
workforce and to create a positive safety culture at all strategic and tactical levels
of the organization. This positive safety culture creates a trust in company policies
and permeates all operational levels with shared goals and safety behaviors as well
as responsibility and accountability for one’s actions.
With the exception of Safety Risk Management, the three components of
SMS are objective in nature. Safety Policy follows directly from an organization
adhering to a philosophy of safety above profits. Safety Assurance protocols adhere
to common statistical analysis and interpretation protocols to assure safety
mitigations are effective. Safety Promotion methods utilize standard training and
communication schema.
The Safety Risk Management component is inherently subjective. The FAA
SMS order disscets the theoretical aspects of the Safety Risk Management (SRM)
element of SMS. FAA Order 8000.369C (FAA, 2020b) and FAA Order 8040.4B
(FAA, 2017b) purposely establish specific aspects of a SRM component the
operator must develop and implement. It does not outline the various perspectives
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and methodologies of hazard identification, risk determination, and risk mitigation.
Once hazards are identified, the composite risk is computed in the risk matrix as a
product of the predicted severity effects and the frequency/probability/likelyhood
of occurance of the hazard. Risk is subjectively determined based on an individual’s
knowledge and experience level.
Risk
Risk Matrix
A risk matrix is a chart that represents the product of a hazard’s severity and
the likelihood, frequency, or probability of an occurrence precipitated by the
hazard. Britton (2019a) characterized the risk matrix as “…the inter-industry safety
standard as the primary tool used in risk evaluation” (para. 1). Common severity
and /frequency/probability/likelihood definitions appear in Table 2.
Table 2.
Common Severity and Likelihood/Frequency/Probability Definitions
Severity Severity Definition Frequency/Probability/Likelihood
Definition
1
No safety effect
Extremely
impropbable1event/10 years
2
Minor-Slight
Unlikely to occur-1 event/5 years
reduction in safety
3
Major-Significant
Unlikely
but
possible-1
reduction in safety event/year
margin
4
Hazardous-Large
Likely to occur-more than 1
reduction in safety time/year
margin
5
Catastrophic-Hull
Likely to occur-at least 1
loss, fatality
time/month

Frequency
1
2
3

4

5

An example of the common risk matrix appears in Figure 2.

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2020

5

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 7 [2020], Iss. 3, Art. 6

Figure 2. Example Risk Matrix.
As seen in Figure 2, the quantification of risk based on a severity value of
5 and a frequency value of 5 results in a risk value of 25. Most charts use a 3-color
schema where green is acceptable, yellow is acceptable with mitigations, and red is
unacceptable. In the example, 25 falls in the red, unacceptable zone.
Strategic Risk
Strategic risk conceived of as predictive risk management involves the
concept of forecasting potential hazardous events and assigning a risk value to them
(Britton, 2019b). This process of risk identification is a critical management
function because it precipitates the allocation of corporate personnel and financial
assets. This first layer risk analysis occurs at an executive level with the purpose of
“analyzing current operations to identify areas of potential concern in future,
hypothetical situation [sic]” (Britton, 2017, para.1).
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American Airlines Flight 331
On December 23, 2009, an American Airlines B737-823, operating under
14 CFR part 121 landed in Kingston, Jamaica and subsequently departed the end
of the runway where it broke into three sections and came to rest. There were no
fatalities although 14 passengers were seriously injured, and the aircraft was
damaged beyond repair (Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority, 2009). Under the
auspices of 14 CFR part 121.97, American Airlines was responsible to “…ensure a
safe operation at that airport” (FAA, 2018). In the case of this accident, pertinent
portions of the regulation included the requirement for American Airlines to
evaluate runways, clearways, and stop ways as well as surface conditions, and
instrument approach procedures at Kingston.
Based on a review of the accident report (Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority,
2009), the weather at the time of arrival was broken clouds at 1,400 feet with the
winds from 320 degrees at 14 knots with moderate rain. The crew chose to execute
the Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 12. This choice resulted
in a direct tailwind of greater than 10 knots. The tower controller reported that the
runway was wet. The crew crossed the runway threshold slightly high resulting in
a touchdown 4,100 feet down the 8,911 foot runway.
The American Airlines risk analysis responsibility is manifested in pertinent
part by the calculation of landing data available to the crew. The landing data
presents required landing distance performance data based on the runway, the
ambient density altitude, the aircraft gross weight, the flap setting, and the
headwind or tailwind components present at touchdown. Using the American
Airlines landing distance tabular data for 30 flaps, the accident investigators
calculated a required landing distance with a 14 knot tailwind and fair to medium
braking of 8,874 feet. The runway is 8,911 feet long leaving a margin of error of
37 feet. These figures included the 15% safety margin required by the FAA and are
based on the assumption that the aircraft crosses the threshold at 50 feet above the
runway (Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority, 2009).
American Airlines likely viewed these calculations as acceptable with
mitigations. To mitigate the minimum margin for error on a wet runway with a
tailwind, American recommended landing with 40 flaps. American also calculated
landing performance using up to a 15 knot tailwind versus the usual limitation of
10 knots. Additionally, the calculations provided a 15% safety margin as discussed
in FAA Advisory Circular 91-79A (FAA, 2014). American Airlines, as the
operator, performed a strategic predictive risk analysis for operations at Kingston,
Jamaica accounting for numerous landing performance circumstances as
demonstrated by the extensive landing tabular data the company made available to
the crew. The importance of the strategic, predictive risk analysis cannot be over
emphasized. Although American changed the tailwind limitation for the B737 to
15 knots, there is no documentation that a risk analysis was completed by
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American, Boeing, or the FAA (Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority, 2009).
Additionally, American did not provide training to the flight crews for landing with
tailwinds exceeding 10 knots. That landing with 15 knots of tailwind fell within the
realm of acceptable, it proved to have quantifiable negative consequences (Jamaica
Civil Aviation Authority, 2009).
Intermediate Tactical Risk
Another term for intermediate tactical risk might be proactive risk
management. Normally, proactive risk management encompasses hazard
identification through surveys and voluntary reporting (Britton, 2019b). For the
practical use by a flight crew, this layer of risk analysis should be expanded to cover
flight crew risk analysis during the preflight and enroute flight phases when
considering potential approach and landing weather conditions. There are
immediate risk analyses relevant to the preflight and enroute flight phases.
However, the risk analyses required for the approach and landing phases will be the
focus to illustrate intermediate tactical risk.
The concept of intermediate tactical risk or proactive risk is to consider
plausable mitigating actions to perceived hazards before they occur. Mitigations are
frequently determined based on crew training, knowledge, and experience
combined with the application of company standard operating procedures (SOP)
(Britton, 2019b). An orderly, formalized decision making or risk analysis process
such as a RISK ASSESSMENT, the PAVE model, or the DECIDE model assists
the pilot to weigh the risks of a planned operation.
Risk Assessment. Figure 3 provides an example of a RISK
ASSESSMENT.
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Figure 3. RISK ASSESSMENT retrieved from (FAA, 2016, p. 2-7).
This tool could have been used by the crew of American 331 to raise
awareness of the potential risks associated with reduced visibility, low ceilings,
high tailwinds, and a wet runway for the approach in Kingston. As a famework for
discussion, the crew might have done a risk analysis and determined that a flaps 40
landing would have been the better option on a wet runway with a significant
tailwind. The crew might have alternately considered landing into the wind on
runway 30.
PAVE. The Pilot Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge characterizes the
value of the PAVE checklist as “Another way to mitigate risk is to perceive
hazards” (FAA, 2016, p. 2-8). PAVE is a mnemonic that stands for Pilot, Aircraft,
EnVironment, and External pressure. It is used to evaluate the readiness for flight
of the components in the mnemonic. In the case of American 331, the crew (P) and
the aircraft (A) met all of the requirements of the PAVE checklist. Additionally, the
accident does not mention any indication that the crew was externally (i.e., the E in
PAVE) pressured by the company to complete the flight to Kingston. The weather,
the V in enviornment, required additional scrutiny and discussion of the potential
hazards associated with arrival at an island destination during a moderate rain
storm.

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2020

9

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 7 [2020], Iss. 3, Art. 6

According to the accident investigation, the dispatcher provided extensive
information regarding arrival weather, airfield notices to airmen (NOTAM), a
primary alternate of Montego Bay, and a second alternate of Owen Roberts
International Airport, Grand Cayman (Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority, 2009).
According to the First Officer, the crew did not discuss the potential hazards and
risks associated with arrival in Kingston during a moderate rainstorm which would
have been appropriate at this preflight phase.
DECIDE. The DECIDE checklist is a hazard evaluation and risk
determination structured decision process that can be used in the latter portion of
the enroute phase or just prior to the top of descent (FAA, 2016). The (D) stands
for the detection of a problem. The problem must first be perceived and then be
evaluated by the crerw using their collective training, knowledge, and experience.
The first step is critical because correct analysis determines the subsequent steps
taken to mitigate the risks associated with the perceived hazard. The (E) represents
the estimate of the action required. The estimate includes elements of discipline,
situational awareness, training, knowledge, and experience (FAA, 2016). Based on
the perceived problem, the flight crew chooses a course (C) of action leading to a
desired outcome. The flight crew is required to accomplish the actions (i.e., the
second D represents the Do portion of the checklist) leading to the desired outcome.
The second (E) portion establishes the feedback loop. Once the decision is made,
the flight crew is responsible to continually evaluate the selected course of action
to ensure that it results in the desired safe outcome (FAA, 2016).
In the case of American 331, the flight crew had numerous opportunities to
evaluate the hazards of landing in the convective activity forecast for their arrival
time. The accident report indicates that the crew completed a cursory briefing
regarding the approach and landing. The First Officer considered the approach and
landing under the reported conditions as “just another day at the office” (Jamaica
Civil Aviation Authority, 2009, p. 21). Prior to the top of descent would have been
an appropriate time to complete a landing performance evaluation and a discussion
of the hazards to include a risk analysis of the various options available to the crew
(Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority, 2009). The options included (a) completing a
circle-to-land after the ILS approach in order to land into the wind; (b) executing
an RNAV runway 30 approach in order to land into the wind; or (c) landing using
flaps 40 with the tailwind. As the flying pilot, the Captain should have emphasized
the importance of touching down in the touchdown zone to mitigate the hazardous
effects of a tailwind and of a wet runway to the First Officer who was the pilot
monitoring. If they were not going to touchdown in the touchdown zone, the
Captain should have directed the First Officer to command a go-around and missed
approach.
American Airlines provided tools to assist the crew in their decision
making. The company recommended 40 flaps be used under the weather and
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runway conditions encountered by the crew (Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority,
2009). The company recommended landing in the touchdown zone at the 800 to
1,500 foot point down the runway (Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority, 2009).
Additionally, if the crew had perceived the problem correctly, they could have
executed the RNAV 30 approach. Both the aircraft and the crew were RNAV
qualified and the weather was above landing minimums for the RNAV approach at
the time of arrival (Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority, 2009).
These decicision making aides of a RISK ASSESSMENT, PAVE, and
DECIDE mnemonics provide a structured multi-layered method to perceive the
problem, perform an evaluation of a course of action, and evaluate the risks posed
by hazards. The flight crew must then execute the course of action employing the
risk mitigations and further determine via a feedback loop if their actions are
achieving the desired results.
Immediate Tactical Risk
The concept of immediate risk or reactive risk management embodies the
element of time criticality. Immediacy engenders “actions in response to
hazard/risk occurance” (Britton, 2019b, para. 1). In the case of frontline employees
such as flight crews, it is their responsibility to take a course of action to mitigate
the risk, avoid an accident, and minimize damages. For rapid decision making in
dynamic circumstances, a simple, systematic approach to hazard identification and
risk evaluation proves most effective (Federal Aviation Administration, 2016).
The 3P model of Perceive, Process, Perform is a very effective structured
model to use in a very dynamic, time critical situation such as landing in adverse
weather conditions. The perceive (P) element of the model is similar in function to
the D in the DECIDE model. Perception of a problem by the flight crew requires
excellent situational awareness. A correct perception of the problem precipitates an
evaluation process represented by the second (P). The process (P) is an evaluation
of the issue relative to flight safety and a determination of the hazard risk value
(FAA, 2016). The third (P) represents perform. Once the flight crew perceives a
problem and decides on a course of action, the flight crew must perform the
required mitigating actions. Figure 4 represents the 3P model. As with previous
models, this model also inherently establishes a continuous evaluation loop to
determine whether the chosen course of action will result in the desired outcome.
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Figure 4. The 3P Model (FAA, 2020c, p. 13-11).
In the case of American 331, it became very clear that the plan to land on
runway 12 with a tailwind was not progressing as conceived when approximately
5 minutes prior to landing ATC advised the crew of the wet runway (Jamaica Civil
Aviation Authority, 2009). The 3P model would have provided a structured risk
analysis and decision making tool for this approach and landing. Through a
continuous analysis of the circumstances, the crew should have perceived that the
approach and landing phases were not proceeding as planned. They should have
processed the hazardous circumstances of high tailwinds, wet runway, heavy rain,
and a reduced flap setting for landing as a high risk threat to the safe conclusion of
the flight (Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority, 2009). Once the crew processed the
high risk to the desired safe outcome of the flight, it was imperative for the First
Officer to command a go-around and for the Captain to perform the go-around
(Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority, 2009). After the crew executed a successful goaround, the reinstitution of the 3P model would have been an appropriate crew
action.The feedback loop should have been integral to the modification of the plan
to either complete a safe approach and landing at Kingston or to divert and land at
an alternate airport.
Conclusions
The various multi-layered strategic and tactical concepts of risk are
important foundational elements in air carrier initial training, recurrent training, and
Captain transition courses. The practical application of risk calculations using a risk
assessment matrix, a pre-departure RISK ASSESSMENT, a PAVE or DECIDE
structured analysis, or a 3P model should be discussed in initial and recurrent
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ground schools as well as practiced in simulator scenarios and during initial
operating experience qualification. The flight crew of American Airlines flight 331
had ample opportunity to include structured risk discussions as part of their crew
briefings during the pre-flight, enroute, descent, approach and landing phases.
The risk matrix is the responsibility of the airline management team.
According to the Janaican Aviation Authority and based on the information
available to the crew, the airline completed the usual and common station hazard
identifications (Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority, 2009). American completed
subsequent risk analyses resulting in a wide range of potential mitigating
information and actions the crew could have used to achieve a safe outcome of the
flight.
The flight crew was provided ample updates to the weather and to the
destination airfield status. The accident report, based on information gleened from
flight crew member interviews, does indicate the crew took advantage of the
information and discussed the options available to them to mitigate the hazardous
conditions at the Kingston airport (Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority, 2009). The
flight crew did appear to recognize (i.e., the D in the DECIDE checklist) the
deteriorating conditions although they both appeared to have a common mental
model of the weather conditions at Kingston that engendered a complacent attitude.
If the flight crew had followed the recognition of the conditions with the remainder
of the DECIDE structured checklist, the discussion might have provided an
excellent format to deliberate various aircraft approach procedures and landing
configurations appropriate for the different environmental conditions the crew
might encounter upon arrival. Using a structured risk discussion such as the
DECIDE mnemonic, the flight crew might have improved their situational
awareness and their sense of urgency and not have perceived that “…the weather
was not abnormal and it was ‘just another day at the office’” (Jamaica Civil
Aviation Authority, 2009, p. 21).
It is important to match the risk analysis with the phase of flight. For
example, the PAVE or DECIDE checklists are not applicable in a rapidly changing
environment experienced while landing in moderate rain (Jamaica Civil Aviation
Authority, 2009). The Jamaica Civil Aviation Authority accident report (2009)
stated that after the flight crew reported on the tower frequency, “The CVR
contained no discussion between the two flight crews [the two pilots] about the
increased tailwind, the reported rain shower activity, the runway conditions or
calculation of landing distance” (p. 26). Under the circumstances, the 3P risk
discussion should have led the crew to the least risk safe outcome that was to
execute a go-around and missed approach. After the successful missed approach
the crew would have had ample time and opportunity to use the DECIDE or 3P
structured analyses to determine the next course of action.
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Determining a flight crew action at its base level is a risk assessment. It is
an imperative that the flight crew members use their collective training, knowledge,
and experience to apply the appropriate decision making tool for the conditions and
phase of flight in a multi-layered approach to ensure the safety of passengers and
crew members. Under the dynamic environmental circumstances involved with
landing in conditions experienced by the American Airlines 331 flight crew, the
application of a suitably formalized, structured risk evaluation tool would have
facilitated a risk informed strategy to effect a safe outcome.
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